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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

The circuit court of appeals of the District of Columbia has ruled recently
that a refund of income taxes for the year 1919, which was allowed after the
passage of the act of 1924, should include interest from date when the tax was
paid to date of allowance, notwithstanding that the payment had been made
without protest. It held, further, that upon the disallowance by the commis
sioner of such interest the taxpayer’s only remedy was by mandamus, and that
the acceptance, under protest, of such account as was voluntarily paid did not
bar the taxpayer’s right to further interest. This is a decision which, if not
subsequently overruled, should be kept in mind by accountants. Heretofore,
the commissioner has charged interest upon deficiencies of taxes from the date
when the tax was due and payable until it was assessed but has not included in
terest in amounts of over-assessments refunded.
Another decision of interest, but not so gratifying as viewed from the stand
point of the taxpayer, is that in which the United States board of tax appeals
ruled, in the case of Lee Sturgis, administrator of the estate of Lucy R. Sturgess,
deceased, that the value of stock in a corporation may not be established by an
ex-parte appraisal of the corporate assets nor by the unsupported opinion of an
accountant. It appears from the matter printed with the decision that the cor
poration in which the estate of Lucy Sturgess had stock, had had an appraisal
made of its assets by an appraisal company, and the administrator had offered
the appraisal report as evidence of the value of the stock of the corporation.
The administrator also had an accountant familiar with the books and accounts
of the corporation by reason of his audit of them, testify as to the value of the
stock. As no representative of the appraisal company was present to identify
the appraisal figures and submit to cross-examination, and as the accountant's
testimony was not supported, the board held that the value of the stock could
not be established.
As pointed out in former issues of The Journal of Accountancy, the
accountant appearing before the board must divest himself of the idea that his
profession is one regarded as engaged purely in finding facts and impartially
reporting them. When he appears for a taxpayer as the representative of the
latter he is regarded as an advocate and must be prepared to prove in a legal
manner facts of which he has become cognizant in his own way, i. e. by examina
tion and interpretation of the books of account. He must divest himself of the
idea that because the matters against which he is protesting and appealing are
usually facts alleged by the commissioner, based upon some other accountant’s
audit and interpretation of the transactions recorded in the books of account,
that his interpretation and statement of facts will be accepted without sup
porting evidence. It would seem to the ordinary layman that an independent
appraisal by a disinterested appraisal company, made at the request of a cor
poration in pursuance of the latter’s ordinary course of business, would be pretty
conclusive evidence of the true value of the corporation’s assets, and should be
acceptable to a body of men responsible for the task of determining the value of
the stock of the corporation. The fact that the commissioner asserts a different
value, presumably one contra to that found by the appraisal company and one
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which when assumed results in the contemplated assessment of additional tax,
immediately places upon the taxpayer the burden of proving, no matter how
difficult it may be, that the facts the commissioner has asserted are not correct.
It does not matter in the slightest degree that the commissioner has no proof or
evidence or testimony upon which to rely in asserting that certain things are
facts. Once he has asserted a fact it stands against the taxpayer, regardless of
how absurd it may be, until the taxpayer can controvert it in a manner that will
be acceptable to the board.
The foregoing is not set down in a spirit of criticism of the commissioner nor
of the board, but to warn accountants that they must be alert to the new phase
of their work. Certified public accountants are admitted to practice before the
board. Let them realize their new responsibilities and prepare to acquit them
selves with credit in this new branch of their work. It is to be hoped that ac
countants will soon prove themselves worthy advocates as well as opponents
and that they will command the same respect in this new field that they now
have in the field of accountancy.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
In determining the amount available for the payment of a dividend, the
actual net income as shown by the books and not the statutory net income
should be used. Invested capital for any given year may be reduced by reason
of dividends declared within that year only to the extent that such dividends
exceed the earnings of that year to the date such dividends are declared.
Income and profit taxes accrue when they become due and payable, and are
deductible from invested capital at that time, and not deductible pro rata
from the earnings of the year to which they relate up to the date of a dividend
payment. (B. T. A. decision 438, docket 1217.)
The cost of improvements on leased buildings not required by the terms of
the lease and made as a condition precedent to procuring insurance at non
prohibitive rates are capital expenditures and should be distributed over the
remaining life of the lease. (B. T. A. decision 439, docket 1888.)
Depreciation upon a building and decorations with useful lives of fifty and
twenty years, respectively, was allowed at a rate of 3 per cent. (B. T. A.
decision 440, docket 2003.)
Money paid into the corporate treasury intended as an increase, of invested
capital is entitled to such classification, although the stock issued in exchange
therefor is made subsequently. (B. T. A. decision 441, docket 1125.)
A subscription list acquired in the purchase of a newspaper business is an
asset subject to fluctuations, and not expiring contracts for which deductions
may be taken. (B. T. A. decision 457, docket 900.)
By the federal control act and the compensation agreement pursuant thereto
the director general of railroads was required to, and did, bear the income
tax on the taxpayer’s income up to 2 per cent. The amount so borne by the
director general was not income of the taxpayer. The United States in levying
taxes and assuming the obligations of federal control was the same sovereign
entity. The commissioner of internal revenue in assessing taxes is not con
fined to the provisions of the revenue acts alone but must determine liability
in the light of all statutes relating thereto. A refusal of the supreme court to
grant a writ of certiorari will not be regarded as an affirmance of the decision
below. (B. T. A. decision 458, docket 974.)
A stock subscription agreement of itself is not property and amounts due
thereon may not be included in invested capital. “Bonus” stock issued to
customer and charged to goodwill may not be included in invested capital in
the absence of evidence of the value of the goodwill. (B. T. A. decision 461,
docket 646.)
A bankrupt concern has no goodwill for purpose of invested capital.
(B. T. A. decision 463, docket 220.)
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A communistic religious society operating under a corporate charter is not
a charitable organization as contemplated by section 231 (6) of the revenue
act of 1918. The board said in rendering its decision upon this case: “The
exemption ... is based on the assumption that all the public interest will be
served, . .
(B. T. A. decision 469, docket 2257.)
A declared dividend is a corporate liability reducing the invested capital
and surplus by the amount of such dividend. Declared dividends remaining
in the corporate business are borrowed, not invested capital. (B. T. A. decision
471, docket 1898.)
Cash consideration involved in the sale or exchange of property is sufficient
to establish the fair market value thereof. (B. T. A. decision 474, docket 1924.)
Payment of a note in recognition of a moral obligation is not a gift but is
taxable for the year in which it is made. (B. T. A. decision 477, docket 944.)
Where in determining the deficiency for one year the commissioner consid
ered an oyer-assessment in a prior year, the board has jurisdiction to review
the tax liability of both years. To determine invested capital in the years
involved, the board has jurisdiction to determine whether proper allowances
were made in years prior to those involved in the appeal. (B. T. A. decision
478, docket 641.)
Property purchased at a foreclosure sale and thereafter bona fide paid into a
corporation for stock may be included in invested capital at the actual value of
such property, though such value is greater than the price paid at the fore
closure sale. (B. T. A. decision 482, docket 544.)
The board has no jurisdiction to review the basis of the commissioner’s
belief that jeopardy exists as provided in section 274 (d) of the revenue act of
1924. The board has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal from jeopardy
assessment, unless abatement thereof has been denied and inability to give
bond for an abatement claim prevents an appeal. (B. T. A. decision 487,
docket 190.)
The value of stock may not be established by an ex-parte report of an
appraisal of corporate assets nor by the unsupported testimony of an
accountant. Where evidence submitted is incompetent a continuance will not
be granted for the purpose of gathering further evidence. (B. T. A. decision
530, docket 2279.)
Where the accounts showing cost of brick and frame dwellings cannot be
separated a combined rate of depreciation is allowable. (B. T. A. decision
534, docket 2371.)
A cost inventory may not be reduced by the amount estimated to be the
depreciated value of damaged items. (B. T. A. decision 541, docket 600.)
The capital-stock tax is based on the entire potentiality to profit by the
exercise of the corporate franchises and the valuation is left to the discretion
of the commissioner, except that he must consider every relevant fact. Such
valuation is not materially less than the net fair value of the assets. (U. S.
supreme court decision—Ray Consolidated Copper Co. v. U. 5.)
A refund of income taxes for 1919, allowed after the passage of the 1924 act,
should include interest under that act from payment until allowance, notwith
standing that the payment had been made without protest; that on disallowance
of such interest, the taxpayer’s only remedy was by mandamus, and that the
acceptance, under protest, of such amount as was voluntarily paid did not bar
the taxpayer’s right to further interest. (Circuit court of appeals, D. C.,—
Blair v. U. S. ex rel Executors of Margaret Murphy, deceased.)
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3699—May 4, 1925)
Meaning of Invested Capital, Revenue Act of 1917—Decision of Court
Excess Profits Tax—Revenue Act of 1917—Decision of Court

1. Invested Capital.
“Invested capital,” under the statutory definition of that term contained
in section 207 of the Revenue Act of 1917, can not be increased by reason of
the appreciation in the value of capital assets.
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2. Decision Followed—Decision Affirmed.
The decision of the supreme court in the case of La Belle Iron Works v.
United States (256 U. S., 377, T. D. 3181 [C. B. 4, 373]) followed. The deci
sion of the United States district court for the southern district of New York
affirmed.
The following decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for the
second circuit, in the case of Union Petroleum Steamship Co. v. Edwards, Col
lector, is published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Union Petroleum Steamship Co., plaintiff in error and below, v. William H.
Edwards, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant in error and below
Writ of error to district court for the southern district of New York
Action is for the recovery of excess-profits taxes alleged to have been illegally
collected. Plaintiff is a corporation of Delaware, organized in 1914, with a
capital stock of $600,000, which represented the investment of the company
organizers in the steamship Westwego.
During the world war the price of shipping rapidly rose, and in March, 1916,
plaintiff offered the Westwego for sale at one and a half millions.
The Anglo-American Oil Co. (a British corporation) was willing to buy at
about the figure named, and when the price was agreed upon the intent of
Anglo-American Co. was to take over the vessel itself by an ordinary bill of sale.
But the Westwego was a vessel of the United States, wherefore it was thought
that a foreign corporation could not lawfully take title. Plaintiff's stock was
all owned or controlled by one man, and the arrangement finally made was that
the entire stock issue of plaintiff was sold by this sole shareholder to AngloAmerican Co. or its nominees for what was in the minds of the parties the pur
chase price of the Westwego. Then plaintiff, as a subsidiary of the AngloAmerican Co., continued to hold legal title to the ship, and to be subject to such
taxing statutes as the United States might enact.
Subsequently there was enacted the revenue act of 1917 (40 Stat., 300),
and plaintiff became subject to the “excess-profits tax,” under which it was
necessary to ascertain the “invested capital” of plaintiff in order to establish
the relation between such capital and the income derived presumably from the
same.
The statute (sec. 207) contains a statutory definition of invested capital of
corporations; the words here important are that such capital is—
“(1) Actual cash paid in, (2) the actual cash value of tangible property
paid in other than cash, for stock or shares in such corporation or partnership,
at the time of such payment (but in case such tangible property was paid in
prior to January 1,1914, the actual cash value of such property as of January 1,
1914, but in no case to exceed the par value of the original stock or shares
specifically issued therefor), and (3) paid in or earned surplus and undivided
profits used or employed in the business, exclusive of undivided profits earned
during the taxable year . .
The treasury department held that plaintiff's invested capital was sub
stantially the $600,000 originally put into the purchase of the Westwego;
plaintiff’s contention was and is that the business nature of the transaction
should be considered, the position of the Anglo-American Co. as the real party
in interest recognized, the fiction of corporate ownership in plaintiff disre
garded, and invested capital for purposes of taxation be taken at what in
business parlance it had cost Anglo-American Co. to get the Westwego.
The department assessed tax on its own theory, plaintiff paid under protest,
and brought this action to recover. At trial verdict was directed against
plaintiff, which brought this writ.
Per curiam: However hard this case may appear to some, we are unable to
perceive any legal merit in plaintiff’s contentions.
If it had been able to take title to the Westwego, this British corporation
would have been obligated pro tanto at least to submit to taxation by the
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United States, and non constat that its condition would have been any better
than it is now.
What was done was deliberate, including the maintenance of an American
corporation to own the American ship, and it will not do to call this legal
scheme a fiction. It may be called a disguise, the Westwego undoubtedly
became a “whitewashed” ship, but the machinery of ownership was designed
and important and in no sense fictitious. The object was to avoid one statute
—that regarding vessel transfers—and if in such avoidance another and quite
different statutory reef is encountered, the matter is only hard in the sense that
it is one of the accidents of financial navigation.
What is really the matter here is that the Westwego came under AngloAmerican control in 1916, when few if any men foresaw the war strain of
taxation that was encountered in 1917.
The corporate apparatus originally created before 1916, and continued of a
purpose by Anglo-American Co., is too rigid to be disregarded. The taxable
entity is plaintiff, and no other; it is impossible to look beyond or behind that
artificial person. What is taxable is plaintiff’s capital, not that of any other,
and what plaintiff is really asking is that we regard as its invested capital not
what went into its own coffers or property but the money of Anglo-American
Co., which went into the pockets of the original shareholders in plaintiff
corporation.
Seeing, therefore, nothing in the nature of things why plaintiff should not
respond to the tax according to its own corporate financial history, which con
tains no reference to the sale of its share stock by its original shareholders, we
turn to the statute (supra), and find it impossible to consider what the AngloAmerican paid either as “actual cash paid in” or the “cash value of tangible
property paid in ” or “earned surplus and undivided profits.” This is because
Anglo-American never paid anything in to the plaintiff; it only bought from
third persons an interest in the plaintiff, and certainly the enhanced value of
plaintiff’s shares can not be called “earned surplus.”
On authority La Belle Iron Works v. United, States (256 U. S., 377) is con
clusive; and see especially exposition of the above statutory definition of
invested capital at page 388.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
(T. D. 370—May 9, 1925)
Limitations upon Suits and, Collections—Decision of Court
Income Tax—Suit to Restrain Payment—Decision of Court

1. Injunction—Distraint—Section 3224, Revised Statutes.
Under the provisions of section 3224, Revised Statutes, an injunction
will not lie against a collector of internal revenue to restrain the collec
tion of a tax legally assessed.

2. Cases Distinguished—Cases Followed.
Hill v. Wallace (259 U. S. 44) distinguished. Graham v. du Pont
(262 U. S., 234) followed.
The following decision of the district court of the United States for the
western district of Washington, northern division, in the case of The City of
Seattle et al. v. Burns Poe, Collector of Internal Revenue, is published for the
information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
the United States for the Western District of
Washington, Northern Division
The City of Seattle, a municipal corporation, D. W. Boe, P. J. Conroy, O. J.
Drevdal, C. Lynn, and B. W. Roberts, plaintiffs, v. Burns Poe, Collector of
Internal Revenue, and C. L. Huey, Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue,
defendants
[February 26, 1925]
The city of Seattle, plaintiff, owns and operates a municipal street-car
system. The individual plaintiffs are employees of the city, in the department

District Court of
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of public utilities, street railway division. The suit purports to be brought
not only for the plaintiffs, but on behalf of others similarly situated, against
the collector of internal revenue, and prays that the defendant, Burns Poe,
collector, and all other persons claiming to act under his authority, and that
of the revenue act of 1921, be enjoined from requiring a return or collecting
any taxes, exacting any penalties, or distraining any property of the plaintiffs,
or its street railway employees. The defendant moves to dismiss the amended
bill.
The court, April 12,1924, denied a temporary injunction in this case, because
of the terms of section 3224, Revised Statutes, and 3226 as amended; Comp.
Stat., sections 5947 and 5949. Upon this motion, the court is asked to recon
sider its former ruling, particular reliance being placed upon the decision of
the district court for the eastern district of Michigan in Frey v. Woodworth,
rendered December 23, 1924. While the decision in that case is relevant upon
the point that the individual plaintiffs here are exempt from tax, the collection
of which is sought, it is not applicable upon the present question, for in the
suit before Judge Simons the tax had been paid under protest, and the suit
was to recover the tax, not a suit to enjoin its collection. None of the cases
cited warrant the granting of the relief prayed.
In Ledbetter v. Bailey, Collector, etc. (274 Fed., 375-81), it was held that
the collector was seeking, not the recovery of a tax, but a penalty—something
designed to punish. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U. S. 429)
was a suit not to enjoin a collector of internal revenue but by a stockholder to
prevent the corporation from voluntarily making a tax return. Veazie Bank v.
Fenno (8 Wall., 533) was a suit to recover a tax paid on the notes of a state
bank; the tax was held valid. The Collector v. Day (11 Wall., 113) was a suit
to recover from the collector a tax, paid by a judicial officer of the state
which had been by the collector assessed upon his salary. United States v.
Railroad Company (17 Wall., 382) was a suit by the United States to collect
a tax. Mercantile Bank v. New York (121 U. S., 138) was a suit by a national
bank to enjoin the collection of a tax assessed by the State upon national
bank shares. The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision dismissing
the bill. Van Brooklin v. State of Tennessee (117 U. S., 151) was a suit to
foreclose state, county, and city taxes assessed upon real estate at a time when
it was owned by the United States.
Language is used in Hill v. Wallace (259 U. S., 44 at 62) that considered
alone it may be argued lends support to the contention of plaintiffs; in that
case, however, the inconvenience resulting from a denial of injunctive relief
and the relegating of complainants to their law action to recover taxes, after
payment, would have been much greater than in the present suit. In that
case it was said:
“ In the case before us, a sale of grain for future delivery without paying the
tax will subject to heavy criminal penalties. To pay the heavy tax on each of
many daily transactions which occur in the ordinary business of a member of
the exchange, and then sue to recover it back, would necessitate a multiplicity
of suits and, indeed, would be impracticable.” [The italics are those of this,
and not the supreme court.]
In the instant case, while the employees affected are numerous, the payment
of the tax is required for the year, not upon “many daily transactions.” In
Hill v. Wallace, supra, the supreme court, however, does not base its deter
mination of the case upon the ground which it discussed, as above; for there
after in its opinion in that case it said:
“The right to sue for an injunction against the taxing officials is not, how
ever, necessary to give us jurisdiction. If they were to be dismissed under
section 3224, the bill would still raise the question here mooted against the
board of trade and its directors. The solicitor general has appeared on
behalf of the government and argued the case in full on all the issues. Our
conclusion as to the validity of the act will, therefore, have the same effect
as did the judgment of the court in respect to the income-tax law in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U. S. 429), to which the government was
not a party but in which the attorney general on its behalf was heard as
amicus curiae."

124

Income-tax Department
That this is the effect of the decision in Hill v. Wallace is pointed out in
the recent decision of the circuit court of appeals of the seventh circuit.
(Reinecke Collector, v. Peacock, 3 Fed. (2d), 583.)
In Dodge v. Osborne (240 U. S., 118) and Dodge v. Brady (240 U. S., 122)
the lower court was upheld in denying injunctive relief. In the former of
these two cases the action of the lower court in affirming the action of the
trial court in sustaining a motion to dismiss the complaint for want of juris
diction because the complainant had adequate remedy at law and because of
the provisions of section 3224 was sustained, the court saying:
“And this doctrine has been repeatedly applied until it is no longer open to
question that a suit may not be brought to enjoin the assessment or collection
of a tax because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute imposing it.
(Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S., 591; Pittsburg, etc., Ry. v. Board of Public Works,
172 U. S., 32; Pacific Whaling Co. v. United States, 187 U. S., 447, 451, 452.)
“But it is contended that this doctrine has no application to a case where,
wholly independent of any claim of the unconstitutionality of the tax sought
to be enjoined, additional equities sufficient to sustain jurisdiction are alleged,
and thus, it is asserted, being such a case, falls within the exception to the
general rule. But conceding for argument's sake only the legal premise upon
which the contention rests, we think the conclusion that this case falls within
such exception is wholly without merit, since after an examination of the com
plaint we are of the opinion that no ground for equitable jurisdiction is
alleged.. It is true the complaint contains averments that unless the taxes
are enjoined many suits by other persons will be brought for the recovery of
the taxes paid by them, and also that by reason of Revised Statutes, section
3187, making the tax a lien on plaintiff’s property the assessment of the taxes
would constitute a cloud on plaintiff's title. But these allegations are wholly
inadequate under the hypothesis which we have assumed, solely for the sake
of argument, to sustain jurisdiction, since it is apparent on their face they
allege no ground for equitable relief independent of the mere complaint that
the tax is illegal and unconstitutional and should not be enforced—allegations
which if recognized as a basis for equitable jurisdiction would take every case
where a tax was assailed because of its unconstitutionality out of the pro
visions of the statute and thus render it nugatory, while it is obvious that that
statute plainly forbids the enjoining of a tax unless by some extraordinary
and entirely exceptional circumstance its provisions are not applicable." [Italics
are those of this, and not the supreme Court.]
In Dodge v. Brady the bill of complaint attacked the constitutionality of
the revenue tax law in the trial court. After the denial of injunctive relief a
supplemental bill was filed alleging that the tax had been paid the collector and
praying its recovery, but without an appeal to the commissioner of internal
revenue for refund. The defendant moved for a dismissal of the supplemental
bill for want of jurisdiction in the court, under section 3224, Revised Statutes.
The lower court dismissed the bill upon the latter ground, and was sustained
therein by the supreme court, the reason, in part, being stated:
“We think that this case is so exceptional in character as not to justify us
in holding that reversible error was committed by the court below in passing
upon the case upon its merits ...”
It is obvious that the needs of government are instant and supreme. The
taxes paid are for the benefit of all; the convenience of the one or class must
yield to the needs and convenience of the government. Doubtless the desig
nation of that which is taxable is a legislative function and not executive, and
an attempt by the executive arm of the Government to exact income, at least
in the absence of express statutory authority, from the property of the state
devoted strictly to the maintenance of the ordinary functions of state govern
ment will warrant the courts in treating an imposition as no tax, and enjoin
its collection; as was done in the case of the United States v. King County,
Wash. (281 Fed., 686), in which the circuit court of appeals for this district
and circuit held the maintenance and operation of a ferry, by the. county,
was the exercise of a strictly governmental function, protected against tax
ation by the federal constitution; and a tax upon persons paying the ferry
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transportation charges necessary for the county to maintain the ferry was an
interference with and burden upon the governmental functions of the state.
In South Carolina v. United States (199 U. S., 437 at 461) the court said:
“These decisions, while not controlling the question before us, indicate that
the thought has been that the exemption of state agencies and instrumentali
ties from national taxation is limited to those which are used by the state in
carrying on of an ordinary private business.”
To attempt to tax a state highway, with its bridges, and ferries, which are
absolutely essential to the freedom and liberty of its citizens, is a vastly differ
ent thing in principle from the taxation of the income of individual employees
of a municipal street-car system, operated as a business upon the state’s
highways. Section 213 of title II, part II of the revenue act of November
23, 1921, in part provides, pages 237 and 238 (pt. 1, Stat. at large, 1923-1924,
p. 267, sec. 213):
“That for the purpose of this title (except as otherwise provided in sec. 233)
the term ‘gross income’ . . . does not include the following items, which
shall be exempt from taxation under this title ... (7) income derived from
any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and
accruing to any state, territory, or the District of Columbia or any political subdi
vision of a state or territory, or income accruing to the government of any possession
of the United Slates, or any political subdivision thereof." [Italics are those of
this court, and not of the act.]
This court agrees with Judge Simons in his holding in Frey v. Woodworth,
supra, that congress by this legislation intended, as stated, alone to exempt
income “accruing to the state, etc.,” and not the income of employees of the
utility. It will be noted in the exemption provided for in subsection 7, income
accruing to any state, etc., is coupled with a like exemption of income ac
cruing to the government. By subsection A (sec. 213 of the act, 42 Stat. at
large, 238) it is provided that the salaries of all officers and employees of the
United States, or its political subdivisions, including the District of Columbia,
whether elected or appointed, are declared taxable, including in the case of the
President and judges of the supreme court and inferior courts of the United
States, the compensation received as such. In so far as the last-named officers
are concerned, it has been held that under the constitution their compensation
is not taxable (Art. III, sec. 1, of the United States constitution, and authori
ties cited in note 211, page 14015, U. S. Comp. Stat.). But the question in the
present case remains unaffected by reason of there [not] being any question
upon this point.
There being no express provision exempting the incomes of employees of such
public utilities, the executive branch of the government should not be enjoined
from collecting such income in advance of a final and authoritative determi
nation that such income is exempt; for if the collector be so enjoined, and
eventually it be finally determined that such income is taxable, there would
be danger that much of the income, the collection of which was enjoined, would
be lost to the United States; and in any event, delay and additional expense in
its collection incurred; all of which would be avoided by a strict compliance
with sections 3424 and 3426 as amended. (Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana
R. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S., 141; Graham, etc., v. du Pont, 262 U. S.,
234.)
Motion to dismiss granted.
(T. D. 3703—May 13, 1925)

Basis for determining gain or loss—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision of Court
Income Tax—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision

of

Supreme Court

1. Gains and Losses—Deductions—March i, 1913, Value.
No deductible loss is sustained under the provisions of the revenue act of
1918 where property purchased prior to March 1, 1913, is sold thereafter for
more than cost but less than the March 1, 1913, value.
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2. Cases Followed.
The cases of Goodrich v. Edwards (255 U. S., 527; T. D. 3174 [C. B. 4, 40])
and Walsh v. Brewster (255 U. S., 536; T. D. 3176 [C. B. 4, 41]) followed.
The following decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case
of United States v. Flannery et al., Executors of the Estate of Janies J. Flannery, is
published for the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States
The United States, appellant, v. Harriet Rogers Flannery and J. Rogers Flannery,
Executors of the Estate of James J. Flannery, Deceased

[April 13, 1925]
Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the court.
James J. Flannery bought, prior to March 1, 1913, certain corporate stock
for less than $95,175. Its market value on March I, 1913, was $116, 325. He
sold it in 1919 for $95,175—that is, for more than cost. He died in March, 1920.
The executors of his estate in returning his income for the year 1919 deducted,
as a loss, the difference between the market value of the stock on March 1,1913,
and the price received. The commissioner of internal revenue disallowed the
loss claimed, and an additional tax was assessed. The executors paid this
under protest, and thereafter, a claim for refund having been denied, brought
this action in the court of claims to recover the amount paid. Judgment was
rendered in their favor. (59 Ct. Cls., 719).
The question presented is whether, under the income tax provisions at the
revenue act of 1918, a deductible loss was sustained by the sale of the stock
in 1919 for more than it had cost, by reason of the fact that on March 1, 1913,
between the dates of purchase and sale, it had a market value greater than
the sale price.
This act provided that net income should include "gains” derived from
sales or dealings in property (secs. 212 (a), 213 (a)); that there should be
allowed as deductions “losses” sustained during the taxable year "incurred
in any transaction entered into for profit” (sec. 214 (a)); and that “for the
purpose of ascertaining the gain derived or loss sustained from the sale or
other disposition of property . . . the basis shall be (1) in the case of property
acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market price or value of such property
as of that date; and (2) in the case of property acquired on or after that date,
the cost thereof ...” (sec. 202 (a)).
The United States contends that under section 214 (a) there was no de
ductible loss whatever unless the taxpayer had sustained an actual “loss" in
the entire transaction by selling the property for less than it had cost; and that
the effect of section 202(a) was merely that if such an actual loss had been sus
tained in selling property acquired before March 1, 1913, only so much thereof
could be deducted as was sustained after the latter date; that is, the difference
between the market value on that date and the sale price.
The executors contend, on the other hand, that section 202(a) established
the market value of such property on March 1, 1913, as the sole basis for ascer
taining the loss sustained, without regard to its actual cost; and that if such
market value was higher than the sale price, this conclusively determined that
there had been a deductible “loss” in the transaction, and fixed the amount
thereof at the difference between the market value on that date and the sale price.
It is clear, in the first place, that the provisions of the act in reference to
the gains derived and the losses sustained from the sale of property acquired
before March 1, 1913, were correlative, and that whatever effect was intended
to be given to the market value of property on that date in determining taxable
gains, a corresponding effect was intended to be given to such market value in
determining deductible losses. This conclusion is unavoidable under the
specific language of section 202(a) establishing one and the same basis for
ascertaining both gains and losses.
Taking this as a premise, we think that the question of determining taxable
gains is concluded, in accordance with the contention of the government, by the
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decisions of this court in Goodrich v. Edwards (255 U. S., 527) and Walshv.
Brewster (255 U. S., 536). These cases, which were decided in 1921, arose under
the income-tax provisions of the revenue act of 1916. That act provided, as
did the Act of 1918, that the “gains” derived from sales or dealings in property
should be included in net income, and also that the losses actually sustained in
transactions entered into for profit should be allowed as deductions. In the
act of 1916, however, the provisions for the ascertainment of the gains derived
and losses sustained from the sale of property were not contained, as in the act of
1918, in one provision, but in separate clauses of the same tenor and effect as the
combined provision in the act of 1918. Section 2 (c) provided that: “For the
purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale or other disposition of
property . . . acquired before” March 1, 1913, “the fair market price or value
of such property as of” March 1, 1913, “shall be the basis for determining the
amount of such gain derived. ” The correlative clause relating to the ascertain
ment of loss was in precisely the same language except that the words “the loss”
and “loss sustained” were used instead of the words “the gain” and “gain
derived.”
In Goodrich v. Edwards, supra, in the second transaction involved, the tax
payer had acquired in 1912 certain corporate stock of the then value of $291,600.
Its market value on March 1, 1913, was only $148,635.50. He sold it in 1916
for $269,346.25, being $22,253.75 less than its value when acquired, but $120,
710.75 more than its value on March 1,1913. A tax was assessed on the latter
amount, which was sustained by the trial court. The government confessed
error in this judgment. After reciting this fact and setting forth the pertinent
provisions of the act, this court, in reversing the judgment, said:
“It is . . . very plain that the statute imposes the income tax on the pro
ceeds of the sale of personal property to the extent only that gains are derived
therefrom by the vendor, and we therefore agree with the solicitor general that
since no gain was realized on this investment by the plaintiff in error no tax
should have been assessed against him. Section 2 (c) is applicable only where a
gain over the original capital investment has been realized after March 1,1913,
from a sale or other disposition of property. ”
This case was followed by Walsh v. Brewster, supra. In the first transaction
there involved the taxpayer had purchased bonds in 1899 for $191,000, which
he sold in 1916 for the same amount. Their market value on March 1, 1913,
was $151,845. A tax was assessed on the difference between the latter amount
and the selling price, namely, $39,155. This tax was held invalid, under the
authority of Goodrich v. Edwards, on the specific ground that “the owner of the
stock did not realize any gain on his original investment by the sale in 1916. ”
In the second transaction involved the taxpayer had purchased certain bonds in
1902 and 1903 for $231,300, which he sold in 1916 for $276,150. Their market
value on March 1, 1913, was $164,480. A tax was assessed upon the difference
between the selling price and the market value of the bonds on March 1, 1913.
It was held, however, that “since the gain of the taxpayer was only the difference
between his investment of $231,300 and the amount realized by the sale, $276,150,” under the authority of Goodrich v. Edwards, “he was taxable only on
$44,850, ” the difference between the purchase and sale prices.
These decisions are equally applicable to the act of 1918. There is no differ
ence in substance between the language of the two acts in respect to the as
certainment of the gain derived or loss sustained from the sale of property
acquired before March 1, 1913; and the correlative nature of these two pro
visions is emphasized in the act of 1918 by their combination in one and the
same sentence. As it was held in these decisions that the act of 1916 imposed
a tax to the extent only that gains were derived from the sale, and that the
provision as to the market value of the property on March 1, 1913, was ap
plicable only where a gain had been realized over the original capital invest
ment, so we think it should be held that the act of 1918 imposed a tax and
allowed a deduction to the extent only that an actual gain was derived or an
actual loss sustained from the investment, and that the provision in reference
to the market value on March x, 1913, was applicable only where there was such
an actual gain or loss; that is, that this provision was merely a limitation upon
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the amount of the actual gain or loss that would otherwise have been taxable
or deductible.
We can not sustain the contention that the decision in Goodrich v. Edwards
is not entitled to controlling weight in the matter of deductible losses because
of the government’s confession of error, or because it involved the question of
taxable gains, as to which it is said, that under a different construction of the
act a grave constitutional question would have arisen which could have no
application to the question of deductible losses. The decision shows that it
was not based on the confession of error or on any constitutional question, but
upon the conclusion that, as a matter of construction, it was “very plain” that
the statute imposed a tax upon the proceeds of sales “to the extent only that
gains are derived therefrom by the vendor.” The language of the opinion is
specific and unambiguous; it embodied the reasoned judgment of the court as
to the proper construction of the act; and it applies equally to the construction
of the similar provisions of the act of 1918, relating to gains and losses alike.
This was recognized by the treasury department, which promptly amended
its former regulations by incorporating therein “the rule announced by the
supreme court in the cases of Goodrich v. Edwards and Walsh v. Brewster
respecting the basis for the determination of taxable gains or deductible losses
in the case of property acquired prior to March 1,1913, and sold or disposed of
subsequent thereto.” (23 T. D. 763, 764.) To the same effect is the opinion
thereafter given to the secretary of the treasury by the attorney general in
reference to taxable gains and deductible losses under both of the acts. (33
Op. Atty. Gen., 291.) And, it may be noted, a like construction has been inde
pendently given by the courts of New York, without reference to any constitu
tional question, to the income-tax law of that state, in which the provisions
relating to gains derived and losses sustained from the sale of property, are a
substantial transcript of those of the act of 1918, except that January 1, 1919,
is substituted for March 1, 1913; this construction being embodied in a series
of decisions, the first of which, relating to taxable gains, was written before
those in Goodrich v. Edwards and Walsh v. Brewster were announced. (Peo
ple ex rel. Klauber v. Wendell, 196 App. Div., 827 (affirmed, without opinion,
232 N. Y., 549); People ex rel. Keim v. Wendell, 200 App. Div., 388; Re Appli
cation of Bush, 206 App. Div., 800.)
It is unnecessary to consider in detail, as in a matter of first impression,
various contentions urged in behalf of the executors in respect to the construc
tion that should be given to the provisions of the act of 1918 in reference to
deductible losses. For the reasons stated we think that the question should be
resolved according to the earlier decisions; and nothing has been suggested
which disposes us to depart from them now. Decisions affecting the business
interests of the country should not be disturbed except for the most cogent
reasons. (National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S., 99, 102.)
Since Flannery sustained no actual loss in the transaction in question, having
sold the stock for more than it had cost, his executors were not entitled to the
deduction which they claimed because it was sold at less than its market value
on March 1, 1913.
The judgment of the court of claims is accordingly reversed.
(T. D. 37.5—May 15, 1925)

Basis for determining gain or loss—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision of Court

1. Gains and losses—Deductions—March 1, 1913, Value.
No deductible loss is sustained under the provisions of the revenue act of
1918 where property purchased prior to March 1,1913, is sold thereafter for
more than cost but less than the March 1, 1913, value.

2. Cases Followed.
The cases of Goodrich v. Edwards (255 U. S., 527; T. D. 3174 [C. B. 4,40],
Walsh v. Brewster (255 U. S. 536; T. D. 3176 [C. B. 4,41]), and United Stales
v. Flannery el al. (T. D. 3703 [see page 6]), followed.
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The following decision of the United States supreme court in the case of
McCaughn, Collector, v. Charles H. Ludington is published for the information
of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States
Blakely D. McCaughn, Collector of Internal Revenue, petitioner, v. Charles H.
Ludington
On writ of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the third
circuit

[April 13, 1925]
Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the court.
This case arises under the income-tax provisions of the revenue act of 1918,
and presents another aspect of the question relating to deductible losses sus
tained from the sale of property acquired before March 1, 1913, which was
involved in United States v. Flannery, No. 527, just decided [see page 6].
Ludington bought, prior to March 1, 1913, certain corporate stock for $32,
500. Its market value on March 1,1913, was $37,050. He sold it in 1919 for
$3,866.91, which was $28,633.09 less than its purchase price and $33,183.09
less than its market value on March 1, 1913. In his income-tax return he
deducted the latter sum as the amount of his loss on the sale of the stock.
The commissioner of internal revenue reduced the amount of the deduction
to the actual loss of $28,633.09, and assessed an additional tax against him.
He paid this tax under protest, and, after the usual preliminary procedure,
brought this suit against the collector in a federal district court in Pennsyl
vania to recover the amount so paid. Judgment was entered for the defend
ant. (290 Fed., 604.) This was reversed by the court of appeals. (1 Fed.
(2d), 689.) And this writ of certiorari was granted. (266 U. S., 599.)
The case is governed by the decision in United States v. Flannery, supra.
It was there held, on the authority of Goodrich v. Edwards (255 U. S., 527)
and Walsh v. Brewster (255 U. S., 536), that the act allowed a deduction to
the extent only that an actual loss was sustained from the investment, as
measured by the difference between the purchase and sale prices of the prop
erty. It follows that as the actual loss to Ludington in the entire transaction
was the difference between the purchase and selling prices—that is, $28,633.09
—he was only entitled to deduct this amount, and not the difference of $33,183.09 between the market value on March 1, 1913, and the selling price.
This is in exact correspondence with the decision in Walsh v. Brewster, supra,
in reference to the second transaction there involved, in which it was held that
the taxable gain derived from the sale of property was only the difference
between the purchase and selling prices, and not the difference between the
market value on March 1, 1913, and the selling price.
So under the income-tax law of New York, which, as pointed out in United
States v. Flannery, is a substantial transcript of the revenue act of 1918, except
that January 1, 1919, is substituted for March 1, 1913, it was specifically held,
in a case precisely similar to the present, that the loss deductible by the tax
payer was limited to the difference between the purchase and selling prices,
although on January 1, 1919, the property had a higher value than when it
was purchased, and the loss if computed from that date would have been
greater than when computed from the purchase price. (People ex rel. Keim
v. Wendell, 200 App. Div., 388.)
The judgment of the district court is accordingly affirmed, and that of the
circuit court of appeals reversed.
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